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to Battered Women?
I. INTRODUCTION
The Ohio Supreme Court recently faced the question whether expert
testimony concerning "battered women's syndrome"' is admissible to sup-
port the claim of self-defense by a woman on trial for murder. Other courts
have considered this issue, and their decisions indicate a general trend in
favor of admitting this type of evidence. z In State v. Thomas3 the Ohio
Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge had not committed reversible
error by excluding the proffered expert testimony.4 Judge Clifford Brown,
author of the court's opinion, 5 waged a brief 6 attack on the use of expert
testimony concerning battered women, finding the evidence irrelevant, un-
necessary, unsupported by accepted scientific knowledge, and more prejudi-
cial than probative.7 This Case Comment examines the evidentiary issues
raised by the use of expert testimony on the subject of battered women in light
of both Ohio case law and the Ohio Rules of Evidence." It also examines the
prospect of future use of expert testimony in similar cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Facts of State v. Thomas
On January 12, 1978, Kathy Thomas killed Reuben Daniels, her common-
law husband. 9 Thomas shot Daniels once in the head and once in the left
arm.' 0 He was slumped forward in a living room chair when the police ar-
1. For a discussion of "battered women's syndrome," see infra text accompanying notes 29-53. That this
term is phrased in the feminine gender is not an indication that the same principles do not apply to battered men.
This Case Comment, however, deals only with expert testimony on the subject of battered women.
2. Four courts held that the exclusion of this testimony constituted a reversible error: Ibn-Tamas v.
United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979) (remanded for a determination of the adequacy of the expert's methodo-
logies; testimony again excluded and a subsequent appeal is pending); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.
1981). In State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980), expert testimony concerning battered women was
held admissible to rebut the defendant husband's claim of insanity. Of the three cases that have found the
proffered testimony inadmissible-State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980); People v. White, 90 1.
App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); and Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981)-none has flatly rejected
the use of expert testimony. In all but the latter case, an effort was made to distinguish the proffered testimony
from that proffered in the cases in which the testimony was held admissible.
3. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
4. Id. at 520, 423 N.E.2d at 139.
5. Of the seven judges participating in the decision, only Judges W. Brown and Sweeney concurred in the
opinion. Judge Holmes concurred in the syllabus and judgment, and Chief Judge Celebrezze and Judges P.
Brown and Locher concurred only in the judgment. Id. at 522, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
6. The opinion is only three pages long.
7. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
8. Kathy Thomas' trial took place in June 1978, prior to the 1980 adoption of the Ohio Rules of Evidence.
The effect of the rules will be examined. See infra text accompanying notes 67-69, 76-77, 93-94, 134, & 165-66.
9. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 518, 423 N.E.2d 137, 138 (1981).
10. State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 398 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137
(1981).
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rived. " According to Thomas' statements prior to the trial' 2 and her testimony
at trial, Daniels became upset and struck her. He pushed her from the kitchen
into the living room and onto the couch. Daniels then moved away from the
couch. Thomas picked up a gun, stood up, moved towards Daniels, and shot
him twice. She then called the police. ' 3 From defendant's statements and
testimony it is unclear exactly where Daniels was when shot or why he was
angry. 14
The couple had lived together intermittently for two years.'s Thomas
testified that she was beaten frequently throughout this period. She left
Daniels on several occasions, but either had returned voluntarily or had been
brought back by force. '
6
On February 13, 1978, Thomas was indicted for murder. '7 At her trial
witnesses testified that Daniels was violent, was a heroin addict, always
carried a gun,' 8 and had killed at least five persons.'9 Daniels' former girl-
friend stated that during her four-year relationship with Daniels he had beaten
her almost nightly.20
Several witnesses frequently had seen bruises on Thomas' body.2' A
physical examination conducted after the shooting revealed bruises and swell-
ing around her eyes, which were determined to be two to three days old.
There was no evidence of physical injuries received on the night of the shoot-
ing.22 During her trial the defendant called two expert witnesses to explain the
concept of battered women's syndrome in order to support her self-defense
claim. 3 After a voir dire examination of the witnesses, the judge concluded
11. Id. At Kathy Thomas' trial a pathologist from the coroner's office testified that the deceased was
probably seated when shot. Id.
12. Two of these statements were made at the scene, and a third at the police station. Id. at 397.
13. Id. at 398-404.
14. In the defendant's first statement she indicated that Daniels sat down after pushing her onto the couch
and that he was seated when she shot him. She stated that he had become upset when something burned in the
oven. Id. at 399 (Lieutenant Lynch's testimony). In defendant's second statement she indicated that Daniels
was about to sit down when he was shot. Id. at 398-99 (Patrolman Coy's testimony). At the police station the
defendant told the police that Daniels was upset because he had found a pawn ticket in her belongings and had
been sitting, but was in the midst of getting up when she shot him. Id. at 400 (Detective Ted Schaefer's
testimony). At trial Thomas said that the fight began when Daniels found the pawn ticket, but escalated when
the fish burned. She also stated that Daniels was on his feet when she shot him, and had fallen back into the
chair. Id. at 401-02.
15. Id. at 398.
16. According to Thomas, after the first time she left Daniels, she returned when he promised he would
change. Thomas and other witnesses testified that on other occasions she had been physically forced to return;
in one instance, she was forced to do so at gun point. Id. at 400.
17. Id. at 397.
18. Id. at 399.
19. Id. at 400.
20. Id. at 403.
21. Id. at 399-402.
22. Id. at 400.
23. Gerald Buckley and Lynn Rosewater were the offered experts. The testimony of the latter was not
considered by the court of appeals because of the defendant's failure to make a proper proffer of her intended
testimony. Id. at 406. The court considered Buckley to be a qualified expert. His qualifications included:
Studying and treating approximately 300 battered women; working as a psychiatric social worker for ten years,
of which about one-fifth involved work with battered women; providing crisis counseling to battered women for
eight years; acting as a referral source for the Battered Woman's Hotline; and counseling batterers for three
years. He also had a master's degree in social work. Id. at 406.
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that their testimony was inadmissible for two reasons: first, the subject was
within the jury's understanding and therefore not proper for expert testimony;
second, neither expert had conducted a personal interview with the defen-
dant.24 On June 20, 1978, the jury found Kathy Thomas guilty of murder. 5
In July 1980 the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's judgment on the ground that the expert testimony of one of the de-
fendant's witnesses was excluded erroneously, and it remanded the case for a
new trial.26 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed this decision on June 24,
198 1.27 Thomas' subsequent habeas corpus action was unsuccessful in U.S.
District Court.28
B. Battered Women's Syndrome
Dr. Lenore Walker, a licensed clinical psychologist, 29 was the first re-
searcher to identify the syndrome common among battered women.30 Having
studied over 120 battering relationships, Walker identified the recurring char-
acteristics of the victims, their abusers, and their relationships.3 From her
findings she generated a profile of the battered woman, including her self-
image and her perception of her relationship with her abuser. 32 To suffer from
the syndrome simply means that the woman fits the profile of the battered
woman. Dr. Walker found that the typical battered woman has little self-
esteem 33 and has traditional views about the importance of home, family,
34
and the roles of men and women.35 Much of the research on the subject of
battered women supports her findings.36
Several of Dr. Walker's findings bear directly on the battered woman's
perception of danger. Most women interviewed felt that their attackers had
the ability to kill them, 37 but were "beyond the grasp of the law." 38 Also,
battered women experience a "learned helplessness," which causes them to
feel they can do nothing about their relationships with their abusers and which
24. Id. at 403.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 407.
27. State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
28. Thomas v. Am, No. C81-1517A (N.D. Ohio Sept. 3, 1982). See also Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 29,
1981, at D4, col. 1; Cleveland Press, July 29, 1981, at A8, col. 1.
29. THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 281 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978). For a discussion of Dr.
Walker's experience in the field of psychology, see L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN xi-xvi (1979).
30. Comment, The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill orBe Killed,32 HASTINGS L.J. 895,927 n.183 (1981).
31. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at xiii.
32. See generally L. WALKER, supra note 29.
33. Id. at 31. See also D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 81-83 (1976).
34. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 31. See also D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 81 (1976).
35. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 31.
36. See generally J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE (1979); R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEAT-
ING: THE SILENT CRISIS (1977); D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES (1976); E. PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR
THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1977); Martin, Battered Women: Society's Problem, in THE VICTIMIZATION
OF WOMEN I I I (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978); Steinmetz, Wife Beating:A Critique and Reformulation of
Existing Theory, 6 ACAD. PSYCHOLOGY & L. BULL. 322 (1978); N. JAFFE, ASSAULTS ON WOMEN; RAPE
AND WIFE BEATING (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 579, 1980).
37. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 75.
38. Id. at 64.
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ultimately changes their perception of the consequences of the violence di-
rected at them. 39 Dr. Walker explains learned helplessness as follows:
Once we believe we cannot control what happens to us, it is difficult to
believe we can ever influence it, even if later we experience a favorable outcome.
This concept is important for understanding why battered women do not attempt
to free themselves from a battering relationship. Once the women are operating
from a belief of helplessness, the perception becomes reality and they become
passive, submissive, "helpless." They allow things that appear to them to be out
of their control actually to get out of their control.40
After studying the interactions between abusers and their victims, Dr.
Walker concluded that battering occurs in a definite cycle. 4, There are three
stages in the cycle: the tension-building phase; the explosion or actual batter-
ing event; and the calm, loving interval between battering incidents.42 During
the tension-building phase low level physical or psychological abuse occurs.43
Fearing escalation, women often attempt to restore equilibrium. 44 If the at-
tempt to pacify the abuser fails, the tension eventually reaches a point when
controls are ineffective. 45 During the close of the first phase women usually
are unable to ascertain the type of harm that will occur; 46 this uncertainty
causes severe psychological stress and anxiety.47 The second stage of the
cycle, the explosion, consists of an uncontrollable discharge of the tension
accumulated during the first phase. Unlike the relatively minor abuse of the
previous stage, the explosion is characterized by major destructiveness. 48
Following the explosion, a calm occurs 49 The attacker will often seek for-
giveness and promise to reform. This makes the woman's decision whether to
take action more difficult."0
Dr. Walker's findings exemplify the type of expert evidence available on
39. Id. at 45-54.
40. Id. at 47.
41. Id. at 55-70; Walker, Treatment Alternatives for Battered Women, in THE VIcTIMIZATION OF
WOMEN 143, 146-54 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978).
42. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 55.
43. Id. at 56. For example, the batterer may throw his dinner across the kitchen or verbally harass the
victim. Id. at 57-58.
44. Id. at 57. "She usually attempts to calm the batterer through the use of techniques that have proved
previously successful. She may become nurturing, compliant, and may anticipate his every whim; or she may
stay out of his way." Id. at 56.
45. Id. at 59.
46. Id. at 60.
47. Id. at 61.
48. -Id. at 59. Dr. Walker gives the following examples:
Major physical assaults included: slaps and punches to the face and head; kicking, stomping, and
punching all over the body; choking to the point of consciousness loss; pushing and throwing across a
room, down the stairs, or against objects; severe shaking; arms twisted or broken; bums from irons,
cigarettes, and scalding liquids; injuries from thrown objects; forced shaving of pubic hair; forced
violent sexual acts; stabbing and mutilation with a variety of objects, including knives and hatchets;
and gunshot wounds.
Id. at 79.
49. Id. at 65.
50. As Walker notes, "Since almost all of the rewards of being married or coupled occur during phase
three .... this is the time when it is most difficult for her to make a decision to end the relationship." Id. at 69.
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the subject of battered women. She has been offered as an expert witness in at
least three cases. 5 The expert witness properly offered in Thomas, like Dr.
Walker, had extensive experience with battered women.5 2 Had he been per-
mitted to testify, he would have shared with the jury his own opinions regard-
ing battering and its ramifications for the abused woman's state of mind-his
concept of the battered woman and her relationship with her abuser.5 3
III. THE EVIDENTiARY ISSUES
In State v. Thomas54 the court provided little in-depth analysis of the
evidentiary issues raised by the use of expert testimony on the subject of
battered women. 5 In this section the four evidentiary issues noted by Judge
Brown will be examined: whether the testimony is relevant; whether it is
helpful; whether the state of the art is sufficient to allow an expert opinion to
be formed; and whether the prejudicial impact of the testimony outweighs its
probative value.
To examine these evidentiary issues, it is first necessary to understand
the self-defense claim.5 6 To establish a claim of self-defense in Ohio,57
a defendant must show that he or she had a bona fide belief at the time of
the killing that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
harm. 58 Because the accused's state of mind is the crux of the defense,59 the
jury must consider the defendant's subjective fears and perceptions when
51. See Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
52. For a discussion of the defense expert's experience and qualifications, see supra note 23.
53. Record at 1547-49.
54. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981).
55. In his opinion, Judge Brown merely incorporated many of the State's conclusions. Compare, e.g.:
Expert testimony on the "battered wife syndrome" by a psychiatric social worker to support
defendant's claim of self-defense is inadmissible herein because (1) it is irrelevant and immaterial to the
issue of whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of the shooting; (2) the subject of the expert
testimony is within the understanding of the jury; (3) the "'battered wife syndrome" is not sufficiently
developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant testimony under the
guise of expertise; and (4) its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value.
Id. at 521-22, 423 N.E.2d at 140, with:
Expert testimony on the "battered woman", given by a psychiatric social worker in support of
Defendant's claim of self-defense to the killing of her husband, is inadmissible on the grounds that: (1)
it is irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether defendant acted in self-defense at the time of the
shooting; (2) The subject of the expert testimony is within the understanding of the jury; (3) Its
prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value; and (4) The "Battered Woman" concept is not
sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant testimony
under the guise of expertise.
Brief for Appellant at 4.
56. For a discussion of the special problems of the battered woman in asserting the self-defense claim, see
Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1704-18 (1981).
57. See generally State v. Robbins, 59 Ohio St. 2d 74,388 N.E.2d 755 (1979); State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St.
2d 15, 381 N.E.2d 195 (1978).
58. State v. Melchior, 56 Ohio St. 2d 15, 20-21, 381 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1978). Besides establishing the
requisite fear, the defendant must also show that the use of such force was the only means of escape and that he
or she had no duty to retreat. Id.
59. State v. Sheets, 115 Ohio St. 308, 152 N.E. 664 (1926); Napier v. State, 90 Ohio St. 276, 107 N.E. 535
(1914); Marts v. State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875).
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deciding whether the requisite fear was present. 60 Of special importance to
the battered defendant is the jury's determination of the imminence issue; 6'
the defendant's perception of a threatening situation is likely to be very differ-
ent from that of the typical juror.62 Thus, if expert testimony regarding a
battered woman helps to explain her perception of imminent danger during
the battering cycle, it is crucial in resolving the self-defense issue.
A. Relevancy of the Expert Testimony to the Self-Defense Claim
It is well established that evidence must be relevant to an issue in dispute
to be admissible. 63 Difficulties arise, however, in defining relevancy and in
applying the definition to the testimony offered in Thomas.
1. The Ohio Test for Relevancy
Ohio case law provides a well-established definition of relevancy. In
Barnett v. State64 the Ohio Supreme Court defined relevancy as "'[alny
matter of fact, the effect, tendency, or design of which, when presented to the
mind, is to produce a persuasion concerning the existence of some other
matter of fact-a persuasion either affirmative or disaffirmative of its exist-
ence.' " 65 The court also noted that the logical relation or causal connection
among facts is a key to the determination of relevancy. 66
60. The jury instructions given in the Thomas case explained the importance of the defendant's subjective
fear:
To constitute self-defense, ladies and gentlemen, there must have been on the part of Kathy
Thomas a careful use of her faculties and reasonable grounds to honestly believe that she was in
immediate danger to her person or to her life.
In determining whether a Defendant such as Kathy Thomas had reasonable grounds for an honest
belief that she was in imminent danger, you must put yourself in the position of... Kathy Thomas,
with her characteristics, with her feelings, with the disparity of size between Daniels and the defen-
dant .... with her knowledge or lack of knowledge, and under the same circumstances and conditions
that surrounded her at the time the act was done.
66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520 n.2, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 n.2 (1981).
61. For a discussion of the imminency requirement, see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR., HANDBOOK ON
CRIMINAL LAW 394 (1972). The requirement has come under attack as applied to battered women. As one
commentator noted:
Dissatisfaction with the imminence standard in the domestic assault context has centered on the
general theme of inflexibility. It may be certain that a deadly attack will occur on the present occa-
sion.... The imminent harm requirement could compel the defender to wait until the "sole opportun-
ity" to take protective action has passed.
Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1710 (1981).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 37-50.
63. Whiteman v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928); OHIO R. EVID. 402.
64. 104 Ohio St. 298, 135 N.E. 647 (1922).
65. Id. at 306, 135 N.E. at 649-50 (quoting I J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 203
(1827)).
66. 104 Ohio St. 298, 306, 135 N.E. 647, 650 (1922). In Dyer v. Isham, 4 Ohio C.C. 429 (Cir. Ct. 1890), the
court similarly stressed the logical connection required for relevancy. "'Relevancy is that which conduces to
the proof of a pertinent hypothesis. A pertinent hypothesis being one which, if sustained, would logically




The Ohio Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1980, codified the existing case-
law definition of relevancy. 67 Rule 401 states, "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less prob-
able than it would be without the evidence." 6 The use of "any tendency"
stresses the liberality of this standard. 69
2. Application of the Ohio Standard in State v. Thomas
In resolving the relevancy issue, Judge Brown merely concluded that the
expert testimony proffered in Thomas was irrelevant to the question whether
the defendant acted in self-defense.70 To reach this conclusion under the
correct relevancy standard, the court would have had to conclude that the
testimony regarding the typical battered woman's perception of a threatening
situation had no bearing on how this particular battered defendant perceived
her situation. 7' The court apparently failed to distinguish between evidence
indirectly related to the self-defense claim and evidence having no bearing
whatsoever on that issue. This confusion is evident from the following lan-
guage in the opinion: "In a trial such as this one, where the evidence raises an
issue of self-defense, the only admissible evidence pertaining to that defense
is evidence which establishes that the defendant had a bona fide belief she was
in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm ... ,, 72 The phrase "which
establishes" indicates that the court may be requiring either that the evidence
directly establish the defense or that it have a strong tendency to prove the
claimed defense. This requirement would conflict with Ohio law.73 In Rose v.
State74 the court noted that ""[i]t is not necessary... that the evidence
should bear directly upon the issue. It is admissible if it tends to prove the
issue, or constitutes a link in the chain of proof .... , Ohio courts contin-
ually have recognized that evidence affecting the probability of a party's claim
67. "'The rule [4011 expresses the usual and general concept of relevancy .... OHIO R. EVID. 402 staff
note.
68. OHIO R. EVID. 401.
69. J. BLACKMORE & C. WEISSENBERGER, ANDERSON'S OHIO EVIDENCE 36 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as BLACKMORE].
70. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
71. This is the position taken by the State. "'Testimony about behavior patterns and psychological charac-
teristics of battered women in general would have no bearing on whether the appellee perceived herself in
imminent danger when she shot her common-law husband while he was sitting in a chair." Brief for Appellant at
5.
72. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981).
73. See Tompkins v. Starr, 41 Ohio St. 305 (1884) (when the issue was whether a brother had promised his
sister that she could stay with him until her death, or only as long as he so wished, his evidence that he had
knowledge of her ill temper and lack of congeniality at the time of the offer was held to be relevant); Allison v.
Homing, 22 Ohio St. 138 (1871) (when the issue was to what price the parties had contracted, evidence
presented by plaintiff showing value of work when the contract was made was held to be relevant); Dyer v.
Isham, 4 Ohio C.C. 429 (Cir. Ct. 1890) (when the issue was whether the defendant had promised to repay a debt,
evidence of his wealth held to be relevant since typically a rich man would be more likely to repay his debts).
74. 13 Ohio C.C. 342 (Cir. Ct. 1896), aff d, 56 Ohio St. 779, 49 N.E. 1117 (1897).
75. Id. at 344 (quoting I S. GREENLEAF, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 51a (14th ed. 1883)).
1982]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43:491
is relevant. 76 Ohio's rule of evidence 401 incorporates this concept.77 Thus,
expert testimony on battered women is relevant to the defendant's self-de-
fense claim if it has any tendency to affect the probability of her claim that she
was in fear of death or great bodily harm.
The State argued that the testimony did not affect the probabilities of
Thomas' self-defense claim because the expert had not interviewed the de-
fendant personally.78 The court adopted the State's conclusion on this point,
but rejected its rationale: "Our conclusion would remain the same even -if
defendant's expert had personally interviewed defendant before being offered
as a witness, even if defendant had conclusively established that defendant
was, in fact, a battered wife ... . ,,79 This position is erroneous in that the
court first assumes the defendant may have been a battered woman and then
finds that testimony regarding how being battered affects a woman's state of
mind has no bearing on the defendant's state of mind. It is not surprising that
of the other courts that have considered this issue, 8° only one even questioned
relevancy. 1
The court also found that the prejudicial impact of the evidence out-
weighed its probative value. 82 This position is logically inconsistent with its
claim that the evidence is irrelevant. The prejudice versus probative argument
assumes that the evidence is relevant. 83 Thus, the court held that the evidence
is both relevant and irrelevant. While it made sense for the State to argue in
the alternative on these issues, the court's unqualified adoption of both
grounds was rational only if its goal was to create confusion for future lit-
igants. This inconsistency is reflective of the court's general lack of thoughtful
analysis of the evidence issues in this case.
76. See Tompkins v. Starr, 41 Ohio St. 305 (1884); Allison v. Homing, 22 Ohio St. 138 (1871).
77. "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact.., more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." OHIO R. EVID. 401 (emphasis added).
78. Brief for Appellant at 5-6. "The alleged expert testified that he had not made any observation of the
appellee. His testimony, therefore, could not have shed any light on the effect, if any, that years of abuse had
upon the appellee's state of mind at the time she shot her husband." Id. (emphasis added). The court of appeals
specifically rejected this personally interview argument. State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 406 (Ct. App.
1980), rev'd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981). Ohio's rule of evidence 703 also rejects the argument
since it allows an expert to form an opinion based on his or her observation of the defendant at the trial itself.
Also, an expert can draw his or her opinion from assumed facts given in hypothetical form. This rule is in accord
with prior Ohio case law. OHIO R. EVID. 703 staff note; Kraner v. Coastal Tank Lines, 26 Ohio St. 2d 59, 269
N.E.2d 43 (1971).
79. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981). Even if the defense had offered unequivocal expert
testimony that the defendant suffered from a "classic case" of battered wife syndrome the court's position
would have remained unchanged. Id. at 521 n.3, 423 N.E.2d at 139-40 n.3.
80. The other cases are: Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408
So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612,277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Griffiths, 101
Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980); People v. White, 90 111. App. 3d 1067,414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); State v. Anaya, 438
A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.
1981).
81. See People v. White, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200 (1980) (evidence found to be
irrelevant).
82. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
83. OHIO R. EVID. 403(A): "Although relevant, evidence is not admissible ifits probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury."
(emphasis added). This rule reflects prior Ohio case law. OHIO R. EVID. 403 staff note.
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In determining the relevancy issue, then, the court made three errors.
First, the court implied that only direct evidence could be admitted to support
the defendant's self-defense claim. 84 Second, it accepted the State's conclu-
sion that the expert testimony had no bearing on the defendant's state of
mind, but rejected the State's rationale for this position, leaving its holding not
only unsupported, but unsupportable.8 Finally, the court without qualifica-
tion adopted logically inconsistent grounds for its decision; its reasoning im-
plied that the evidence was both relevant and irrelevant.'
B. The Helpfulness of Expert Testimony Concerning Battered Women
The parties and the judges involved in this litigation expressed strongly
differing" opinions on whether expert testimony on the subject of battered
women would be helpful to the jury.87 The Ohio Supreme Court found that
expert testimony on this topic was unnecessary. 8 Other jurisdictions are
divided on this question.8 9 Although Ohio law provides a well-defined stand-
ard for determining when expert testimony can be admitted, the application of
the standard often turns on the elusive question of what is within the common
understanding of the average layperson.
1. The Ohio Standard for Expert Testimony
Ohio courts repeatedly have held that to be admissible, expert testimony
must concern a subject that is beyond the common knowledge of the average
person so that the expert evidence will assist the jury in determining a
question of fact.90 In McKay Machine Co. v. Rodman9' the court stated:
84. See supra text accompanying notes 70-77.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
87. Compare "[T]he literature clearly establishes that the subject of the battered woman, and especially her
unique psychological characteristics and differences in reaction and perception, is not one within the knowledge
and comprehension of the average person," State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397,405 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 66
Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (majority opinion of the court of appeals), with "Certainly, ajury can
readily appreciate and understand the effect upon a person that years of abuse would have, without the aid of
expert testimony," Brief for Appellant at 6, and with "There is no question that the issue of battered women is
beyond the common knowledge of the average person," Brief for Appellee at 3, and with "The jury is well able
to understand and determine whether self-defense has been proven in a murder case without expert testimony
such as that offered here," State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981).
88. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
89. The cases in which the testimony was found helpful include: Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626,
635 (D.C. 1979); Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981);
and State v. Baker, 120 N.H. 773, 424 A.2d 171 (1980). The cases in which the testimony was found unhelpful
include: State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980); People v. White, 90 111. App. 3d 1067,414 N.E.2d
196 (1980); and Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981). In these three cases, however, the courts distin-
guished their cases from those in which the testimony has been admitted, which suggests that under different
circumstances they might find such evidence helpful.
90. Ragone v. Vitali & Beltrami, 42 Ohio St. 2d 161,327 N.E.2d 645 (1975); McKay Mach. Co. v. Rodman,
II Ohio St. 2d 77, 228 N.E.2d 304 (1%7); Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452 (1853). But see
Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Terry, 14 Ohio C.C. 536 (Cir. Ct. 1897) (if the court believes that the expert
opinion will aid the jury, it can admit the evidence even though it is not really in an area requiring an expert).
91. II Ohio St. 2d 77, 228 N.E.2d 304 (1967).
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[T]his court has continuously held that in all proceedings involving matters of a
scientific, mechanical, professional, or other like nature, requiring special study,
experience or observation not within the knowledge of laymen in general, expert
opinion testimony is admissible to aid the court or jury in arriving at a correct
determination of the litigated issue.
92
Although the Ohio Rules of Evidence basically adopted this standard,9
there now appears to be more emphasis on whether the expert will assist the
jury than on whether the subject is beyond the common knowledge of the
average person. Rule 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opin-
ion or otherwise." 94 Therefore, under Ohio law expert testimony is admis-
sible when it will assist the trier of fact to evaluate information in an area with
which it is not completely familiar.
2. Application of the Ohio Standard in State v. Thomas
The crucial question in applying the Ohio standard is whether the expert
testimony will assist the jury. 95 This, in turn, is dependent upon how well the
jury understands the subject matter of the testimony. The key question in
Thomas, therefore, is whether the jury understood spousal abuse to such an
extent that expert testimony would not have assisted its determination
whether the defendant was in fear of death or great bodily harm when she shot
Daniels.
The Ohio Supreme Court found the topic of battered women to be well
understood by the public. 96 The court is not alone in this view. In State v.
Griffiths97 the Idaho Supreme Court held that psychiatric testimony regarding
whether the defendant had been in fear when she killed her alleged attacker
was inadmissible since fear is a common emotion that the jury could under-
stand without an expert.98 In two other cases expert testimony on battered
women was found unnecessary for the jury's determination of the self-defense
issue. 9 However, those courts did not base their decisions on the belief that
wife beating is well understood by the public.'0°
92. Id. at 81. 228 N.E.2d at 307.
93. See OHIO R. EVID. 702 staff note; BLACKMORE, supra note 69, at 105.
94. OHIO R. EVID. 702.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 90-94.
96. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,521,423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981). But see State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397,408
(Ct. App. 1980) (Krupansky, J., dissenting), rev'd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981), which seems to
suggest that in the appropriate case, such testimony would be helpful. Judge Krupansky, later a member of the
Ohio Supreme Court, took part in the court of appeals' decision in Thomas.
97. 101 Idaho 163, 610 P.2d 522 (1980).
98. Id. at 165, 610 P.2d at 524.
99. See People v. White, 90 111. App. 3d 1067,414 N.E.2d 196 (1980); Buhrle v. State. 627 P.2d 1374 (Vyo.
1981).
100. In People v. White, 90 11. App. 3d 1067, 414 N.E.2d 196 (1980), a physician who had treated battered
women in his practice was prohibited by the trial court from expressing his opinion why these women stayed
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The Georgia Supreme Court adopted the opposite position on this issue.
In Smith v. State'0 ' it stated:
The trial court ... found that the jurors could draw their own conclusions as
to whether the defendant acted in fear of her life. We disagree and find that...
why a person suffering from battered woman's syndrome would not leave her
mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased aggression
against herself, would be such conclusions that jurors could not ordinarily draw
for themselves. 
02
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and a Florida court of
appeals have also determined that expert testimony can provide the jury with
otherwise unavailable insight into the battering relationship.'03 It is doubtful
that the average person's exposure to or knowledge of wife beating varies
significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Thus, the opposing outcomes on
this issue are more likely the results of the judges' own biases on the subject
of battered women, rather than any regional differences in the public's under-
standing of wife abuse.
3. The Jury's Understanding of Battering
It is only within the last decade that a significant amount of research on
battered women has been conducted. '04 Several of these studies indicate that
the general public does rfot understand spouse abuse. According to Dr.
Lenore Walker:
The battering of women, like other crimes of violence against women, has been
shrouded in myths. All of the myths have perpetuated the mistaken notion that the
victim has precipitated her own assault. Some of them served as a protection
against embarrassment. Others were created to protect rescuers from their own
discouragement when they were unsuccessful in stopping the brutality. It is im-
portant to refute all the myths surrounding battered women in order to understand
fully why battering happens, how it affects people, and how it can be stopped. 
05
A study of domestic violence in Ohio revealed similar findings: "The silence
about mate abuse has created shame, guilt, and isolation for the victims.
with their abusers. The court found no error in the exclusion of this testimony because it had "no useful
purpose." However, the court differentiated the doctor's testimony from that of a psychologist who would
approach the topic from a psychological perspective. Id. at 1072,414 N.E.2d at 200. In Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d
1374 (Wyo. 1981), the court found the testimony unhelpful because of its "inadequate foundation." Id. at 1378.
101. 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678 (1981).
102. Id. at 619, 277 S.E.2d at 683.
103. Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
104. See generally ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE REPORT
FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (1978); J. FLEMING, STOPPING
WIFE ABUSE (1979); R. LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS (1977); D. MARTIN,
BATTERED WIVES (1976); E. PIZZEY, SCREAM QUIETLY OR THE NEIGHBORS WILL HEAR (1977); L.
WALKER, supra note 29; Martin, Battered Women: Society's Problem, in THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN
I l l (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978); Walker, Treatment Alternativesfor Battered Women, in THE VICTIM-
IZATION OF WOMEN 143 (J. Chapman & M. Gates eds. 1978); N. JAFFE, ASSAULTS ON WOMEN; RAPE AND
WIFE BEATING (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 579, 1980).
105. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 18.
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Community attitudes have created myths and misunderstandings, especially
that those who remain in abusive homes, enjoy the beatings. The lack of
information allows the community to deny the existence of the problem." 106
The same study indicated that the legal community shares the general public's
misconceptions concerning battered women since it is a topic ignored by law
schools. 107
Of the numerous myths exposed by researchers,', two are particularly
intertwined with the believability of a battered woman's self-defense claim.
First is the misconception that instead of fearing physical abuse, the battered
woman enjoys it.'09 A juror harboring this notion is likely to doubt a battered
woman's claim that she was in fear for her life when she killed her attacker.
The second myth likely to interfere with the jury's evaluation of the evidence
is that a woman truly fearful of the abuser will leave him, or at least seek
outside help. "O This failure to appreciate the battered woman's social, emo-
tional, and economic position causes jurors to evaluate the defendant's tes-
timony in light of their own notions about why a battered woman would stay
with, or return to, her abuser."' As noted in Ibn-Tamas v. United States,"
2
expert testimony will add credibility to the defendant's testimony concerning
both her relationship with the deceased and her state of mind when she killed
him. "' In Ibn-Tamas the District of Columbia Court of Appeals went on to
explain:
Dr. Walker's contribution, accordingly, would have been akin to the psychiatric
testimony admitted in the case of Patricia Hearst "to explain the effects kidnap-
ping, prolonged incarceration, and psychological and physical abuse may have had
on the defendant's mental state at the time of the robbery, insofar as such mental
state is relevant to the asserted defense of coercion or duress." 114
C. The State of the Art Issue
Judge Brown's third ground for finding testimony on battered women
inadmissible was that" 'battered wife syndrome' is not sufficiently developed,
106. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE REPORT FROM THE AT-
TORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 21 (1978).
107. Id. at 18.
108. Walker enumerated 21 commonly held myths. L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 19-31.
109. For a discussion of the masochism theory, see J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 74-81 (1979); R.
LANGLEY & R. LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 78, 123-25 (1977); L. WALKER, supra note 29, at
20.
110. For a discussion of why the battered woman stays with her abuser, see ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
TASK FORCE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, THE REPORT FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERALS TASK FORCE ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 22 (1978); J. FLEMING, STOPPING WIFE ABUSE 81-95 (1979); R. LANGLEY & R.
LEVY, WIFE BEATING: THE SILENT CRISIS 111-23 (1977); D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 72-86 (1976); and
L. WALKER, supra note 29, at 42-54.
I11. In her briefThomas argued: "Without expert testimony which explains the battered woman syndrome
and how it relates to the reasonableness of her actions, she cannot receive a fair trial from ajury which is part of
the ignorant public." Brief for Appellee at 6. In Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982),
the court noted, "'It is precisely because a jury would not understand why appellant would remain in the
environment that the expert testimony would have aided them in evaluating the case." Id. at 807.
112. 407 A.2d 626, 634 (D.C. 1979).
113. Id.
114. Id. (quoting United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889, 890 (N.D. Cal. 1976)).
[Vol. 43:491
1982] BATTERED WOMEN'S SYNDROME
as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant tes-
timony under the guise of expertise .... " The court cited Frye v. United
States1 6 to support its conclusion. 17 Although Frye's state of the art test is
applicable for certain types of scientific evidence, it was both inappropriate
and incorrectly applied here.
1. The General Acceptance Standard-Frye v. United States
In Frye v. United States"8 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held that the results of a polygraph test were inadmissible because the device
was not generally recognized by physiological and psychological authori-
ties. "9 The court stated:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the exper-
imental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized
scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must
be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.'2
The Frye standard requires that the test or methodology used to deduce
certain scientific evidence be generally accepted in its relevant field. Accord-
ingly, expert testimony is inadmissible when based on principles or devices
that are still viewed as experimental, regardless of how accurate the principle
or device is shown to be.'
2
'
2. Decline of the Frye Standard
Although Frye still is cited extensively, many courts have either al-
tered '2 or rejected completely '2 its standard. In State v. Soue112 4 the Ohio
Supreme Court also retreated from the Frye standard. In Souel it held that
115. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 522, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
116. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
117. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981).
118. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
119. Id. at 1014.
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. 21 S. TEX. L.J. 62, 63-64 (1980).
122. One element of the standard that has been subject to alteration is the determination of who must have
generally accepted the technique or procedure. In Frye the court rejected the use of polygraph evidence
because psychological and physiological experts had not recognized the procedure. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.
Cir. 1923). In People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 858, 331 P.2d 251 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1958), a
California appellate court held that scientific evidence was admissible if it had been "generally accepted by
those who would be expected to be familiar with its use." Id. at 862, 331 P.2d at 254. This redefinition of the
appropriate scientific community that must have accepted the procedure is now generally followed by courts. A.
MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2d ed. 1978). But see United States
v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (voice print evidence held inadmissible because it had not been
generally accepted by the "scientific community as a whole").
123. E.g., Coppolino v. State, 223 So. 2d 68, 70 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968), appeal denied, 234 So. 2d 120
(Fla. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927 (1970) (even though method for detecting succinylcholine chloride in body
tissue not generally accepted in field of pathology, the trial court had not erred by admitting results since witness
had shown the procedure's "reasonable demonstrability"); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978):
[I]n regard to the admissibility of expert testimony, we conclude that there is no justifiable distinction
in principle arising because such expert testimony may happen to involve newly ascertained or newly
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polygraph results were admissible provided the following conditions were
met: (1) All parties and counsel must sign a written stipulation that the de-
fendant would submit to the test and that the evidence would be admitted; (2)
the trial judge must be convinced that the examiner was qualified and the
examination was properly conducted; (3) if the results and the examiner's
opinions are offered as evidence, the nonoffering party may cross-examine
the expert regarding his qualifications, the conditions under which the tests
were conducted, the possibilities of error, and any other matter the trial court
finds relevant; and (4) if the evidence is admitted, the jury shall be instructed
that the evidence is not to be treated as conclusive of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.2 5 The court adopted 2 6 these requirements from State v.
Valdez, 127 a case decided by the Supreme Court of Arizona. In Valdez the
court held that even though the polygraph had not attained the general accep-
tance required by Frye, it had reached "a state in which its results are proba-
tive enough to warrant admissibility upon stipulation." 128 Similarly, the Ohio
Supreme Court noted:
Despite the ongoing controversy concerning the degree of accuracy of the
polygraph device, it is our opinion that observance of the Valdez qualifications
establishes a proper foundation for the admission of polygraph test results, and
that these results have probative value in the determination of whether the exam-
inee has been deceptive during interrogation. 129
About the Frye standard the court stated that "[tihis standard for admissibil-
ity of polygraph evidence has not gone unchallenged, and some commentators
contend that normal evidentiary requirements should be substituted for the
artificially high test first established in Frye." 30 The court then quoted with
approval two passages from McCormick's treatise. The thrust of the first
passage was that the normal evidentiary rules provide a sufficient threshold
for scientific evidence: 3 '' "'If the courts used this approach, instead of re-
peating a supposed requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere im-
posed, they would arrive at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific
applied scientific principles. The controlling criteria regarding the admissibility of expert testimony, so
long as the proffered expert is qualified and probative value is not substantially outweighed by the
factors mentioned in Rule 403, are whether in the sound judgment of the presiding Justice the testimony
to be given is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue.
Id. at 503-04. See generally A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 5-8 (2d
ed. 1978); Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A Haif-Centnry
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1228-30 (1980); 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875 (1979); 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 774
(1980); 21 S. TEX. L.J. 62, 70 (1980).
124. 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978).
125. Id. at 132, 372 N.E.2d at 1323.
126. Id. at 133, 372 N.E.2d at 1323.
127. 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1%2).
128. Id. at 283, 371 P.2d at 900.
129. State v. Souel, 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 133, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1323-24 (1978) (emphasis added, footnote
omitted).
130. Id. at 130 n.4, 372 N.E.2d at 1322 n.4 (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 130-31 n.4, 372 N.E.2d at 1322 n.4.
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advances."' 132 In the second passage McCormick noted and criticized the
judicial hesitancy towards polygraph evidence. 33 Thus, Souel establishes that
the Frye standard is no longer applicable to polygraph evidence in Ohio when
the four prerequisites are met. Further, the Ohio Rules of Evidence do not
address the standard for admissibility of novel scientific evidence in Ohio
courts,'-" and therefore do not affect this question.
The Thomas decision, therefore, creates a double standard for the admis-
sibility of scientific evidence in Ohio. 135 Even though the general acceptance
standard is no longer applicable to polygraph results 136 -the precise type of
evidence that gave rise to the standard 37-the court imposed the Frye stand-
ard upon expert testimony concerning battered women without any explana-
tion of this inconsistency. As one commentator has noted, "Instead of using
Frye as an anlytical tool to decide whether novel scientific evidence should be
admitted, it appears that many courts apply it as a label to justify their own
views about the reliability of particular ... techniques." 138
3. Appropriateness of the Frye Standard for Evidence Not
Involving a Test or Device
Even if the Frye standard were in full force in Ohio, the type of evidence
at issue in Thomas should not have triggered its application. While the Frye
test may be applicable to evidence generated from polygraphs, intoxication
tests, and speed radar devices, it is inapplicable to psychiatric or psycholog-
ical testimony not involving tests or devices. 39 In referring to psychiatric
evidence a commentator noted:
It is obvious that this form of evidence-which purports to be scientific, although
admittedly more "social" in background-has been more readily and easily ac-
cepted by courts than the more objective "physical" evidence from scientific
devices. The rule of the Frye case has not been applied to this field, apparently
because the evidence in opinion form is not tantamount to being the result of a
device or mechanical instrument. 40
One of the criticisms lodged against Frye is that it does not apply to psychiat-
132. Id. at 131 n.4, 372 N.E.2d at 1322 n.4 (quoting MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EV-
IDENCE § 203, at 491 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).
133. 53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 131 n.4, 372 N.E.2d 1318, 1322-23 n.4 (1978).
134. OHIO R. EVID. 702 staff note. Fora discussion of how the enactment of the FederalRules of Evidence
is viewed as affecting such evidence, see Giannelli, supra note 123, at 1239-45.
135. For a discussion of how other courts have developed similar double standards for scientific evidence,
see Giannelli, supra note 123, at 1219-21.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 124-34.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
138. Giannelli, supra note 123, at 1221.
139. Boyce, Judicial Recognition of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases, 8 UTAH L. REV. 313, 324-25
(1964).
140. Id. at 324.
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ric evidence and thus creates a double standard '4 1-one that is the exact
inverse of Ohio's present double standard. 142
While the underlying rationale of Frye may justify the standard's applica-
tion to physical evidence generated from scientific devices, it does not justify
its application to the softer type of evidence generated from psychological
studies. The judicial hesitancy to admit scientific evidence is in part because of
the belief that the jury will view the test or device as infallible.' 43 For example,
evidence produced by the polygraph, the use of truth-serum, and mathemat-
ical certainties is likely to be viewed as determinative by the jury.'44 Since the
results from these tests often go directly to the guilt or innocence of the
accused, the cost of error is great. In contrast, juries do not accept the soft
information resulting from psychological studies with the same deference.
The jurors' individual experiences with human behavior deter them from
viewing the evidence as infallible. Moreover, expert testimony about how the
typical battered woman perceives danger does not go directly to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant, and thereby lessens the cost of error. In short, the
concerns raised by the use of demonstrative scientific evidence are simply not
presented by expert evidence of battered women's syndrome.
4. Application of the Frye Standard to the
Expert's Methodology
If the Frye standard is applicable at all to this type of psychological
evidence, 145 its application is limited to the expert's methodology, '4 and does
not pertain to his or her conclusions.' 47 This is established by the language of
Frye: "The thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs." 148
141. "[T]he Frye standard has been criticized as overly rigorous and as introducing an element of inconsis-
tency into the law of evidence. Thus, it is asked, why should the polygraph, for example, be held to a standard
apparently different from that applied to the principles of Freudian psychology?" Strong, Questions Affecting
the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL. L.F. 1, II (footnotes omitted).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 135-38.
143. MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 490 n.32 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
144. Id.
145. For a discussion of why it is not applicable, see supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
146. "Methodology" as used here means a system of analysis or procedure for study.
147. This reasoning was advanced by the court in Ibn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 638-39 (D.C.
1979).
148. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added). But see Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827
(D.C.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977). "[E]xpert testimony is inadmissible if 'the state of the pertinent art or
scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert."' Id. at 832
(quoting MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)). In Ibn-Tamas
v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979), the court insisted its language in Dyas only required a general
acceptance of the scientific methodology, not of the particular results based on that methodology. It explained
its reasoning as follows:
It is true that the state of scientific knowledge itself can be so meager in a particular field of study
that courts will preclude reliance on expert testimony about it .... but such instances merely reflect
the court's conclusion that no methodology for making the inquiry has been discovered; the proffer did
not meet a threshold test of believability.
Id. at 638 (citation omitted).
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This distinction between methodology and the subject matter being stud-
ied has generated confusion for courts attempting to apply the general accep-
tance standard to expert testimony on battered women. In Buhrle v. State '49 it
is difficult to tell whether the court found the expert's methodology insuffi-
cient, her findings insufficient, or both. "0 The Thomas opinion demonstrated
a similar lack of clarity. i15 Only in Ibn-Tamas v. United States 52 has a court
addressed the distinction between methodology and findings.' 53
The final question to be answered, therefore, is how the methodology1
54
of the expert offered in Thomas would fare in light of the Frye standard. The
State addressed this issue in its brief: "The record is devoid of evidence
concerning the general acceptance of the expert's methodology for identifying
and studying battered women .... Nothing was said of the techniques for
interviewing, the duration of the interview, the number of times each woman
was interviewed or any follow-up." ' While the State's assertions are cor-
rect, it must be noted that the defendant's expert, Gerald Buckley, was not
claiming to base his opinions on any particular systematic study or test.
Rather, his conclusions were based upon his 10 years of experience in work-
ing with battered women, part of which included studying over 300 abused
women. 5 6 Thus, Buckley's methodology for arriving at his conclusions, if he
indeed had one, was his experience with battered women. Clearly, the Frye
standard cannot be applied to an expert's experience in a particular area. This
is one reason courts have exempted from the general acceptance standard
psychological and psychiatric evidence not involving tests or devices. '57 Ex-
perience with a subject in and of itself is a valid basis for forming an expert
opinion,' 58 even when the area is clearly scientific in nature and established
methodologies exist. '9 Thus, having a methodology that is generally accepted
is necessary only when the expert's opinions are based upon or are the result
of that methodology.
149. 627 P.2d 1374 (Wyo. 1981).
150. See id.
15 I. Initially, the court noted that "no general acceptance of the expert's particular methodology has been
established." 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521,423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981) (footnote omitted). In the following paragraph,
however, the court indicated that it was the subject matter that was insufficient. "Mhe 'battered wife syn-
drome' is not sufficiently developed, as a matter of commonly accepted scientific knowledge, to warrant
testimony under the guise of expertise." Id. at 521-22. 423 N.E.2d at 140.
152. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
153. Id. at 638-39. The court remanded the case for a determination whether the expert's methodology met
the Fr e standard. On remand the trial judge found that the expert's methodology had not been shown to be
generally accepted. This decision is now on appeal. Sternberg, Admissibility of Erpert Testimony on Battering,
in WOMEN'S SELF-DEFENSE CASES 210, 217 (E. Bochnak ed. 1981).
154. For a discussion of the expert's qualification, see supra note 23.
155. Brief for Appellant at 7.
156. State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 406 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,423 N.E.2d 137
(1981).
157. For a discussion of this exception, see supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
158. OHIO R. EVID. 702.
159. E.g.. State v. Maupin, 42 Ohio St. 2d 473, 330 N.E.2d 708 (1975) (a police officer experienced in
narcotics was permitted to give his opinions regarding the identification of a drug even though he had conducted
no scientific analysis upon the substance).
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The Ohio Supreme Court made three errors in dealing with the state of
the art issue in Thomas. First, it applied Frye's general acceptance standard,
which it had rejected previously. 16 Second, it failed to realize that this stand-
ard was inappropriate for psychological evidence not based upon a test or
study. 16' Finally, it failed to distinguish between the subject of battered
women and the methods used to study the topic. As a result, the court failed
to realize that Buckley had offered an opinion based not on any methodology
but rather on his extensive experience with battered women. 162
D. Prejudicial Impact Versus Probative Value
The court's final argument for finding the expert testimony regarding
battered women inadmissible was that its prejudicial impact outweighed its
probative value: 163 "[W]e believe the expert testimony offered here would
tend to stereotype defendant, causing the jury to become prejudiced. It could
decide the facts based on typical, and not the actual, facts." '64
Ohio's evidence rule 403(A) defines Ohio's standard for evidence that is
more prejudicial than probative: "Although relevant, evidence is not admis-
sible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." '6 This rule
restates prior Ohio case law.66
Balancing probative value against prejudicial impact is a difficult task
that calls for careful case by case analysis.' 67 A court first must consider
whether the introduction of the evidence will have an unfair prejudicial impact
on the jury. The "mere possibility" that the evidence may have such an
impact is not sufficient to trigger the application of this test. 'r If the court
reaches an affirmative conclusion in this first step, it must then determine the
probative value of the offered evidence. Finally, the court must weigh the
prejudicial impact against the probative value and exclude the evidence only if
the former substantially outweighs the latter.' 69
While the Ohio rule offers no definition of unfair prejudice, 170 the advis-
ory committee's note to its federal counterpart does: "'Unfair prejudice'
160. See supra text accompanying notes 124-34.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 145-59.
163. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 522, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
164. Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140. Cf. Dyer v. Isham, 4 Ohio C.C. 429,433-34 (Cir. Ct. 1890) (evidence that
defendant was a wealthy man when he allegedly promised to repay a debt admissible since typically a rich man
would be more likely to make such a promise).
165. OHIO R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
166. Id. staff note.
167. BLACKMORE, supra note 69, at 40.
168. Id. at 15.
169. OHIO R. EVID. 403.
170. Ohio case law similarly is devoid of a thorough explanation of what constitutes unfair prejudice. What
little case law there is has generally involved personal injury claims. See Hudock v. Youngstown Mun. Ry., 164
Ohio St. 493, 132 N.E.2d 108 (1956); Toledo, Col. & 0. Riv. R.R. v. Miller, 103 Ohio St. 17, 132 N.E. 156 (1921);
Johnson v. Knipp, 36 Ohio App. 2d 218, 304 N.E.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1973); Cushman Motor Delivery Co. v.
Smith, 51 Ohio App. 421, 1 N.E.2d 628 (Ct. App. 1935).
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within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an im-
proper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." '71 Ev-
idence of this sort typically "appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its
sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings
of human action .... 172
The initial issue in applying this analysis to the Thomas case, therefore, is
whether testimony by an expert regarding his experience with battered
women would unfairly prejudice the jury by encouraging a decision based on
improper reasoning. In this regard, Judge Brown expressed concern that the
jury would unduly stereotype the defendant and thus ignore the actual facts
of the case. 73 This reasoning ignores the likelihood that the jury already had
stereotyped Thomas as a masochist who thrived on brutality.' 74 Thus, the
probative value of the evidence becomes apparent: the offered testimony
would serve to educate the jury and thereby add to the credibility of the
defendant's self-defense claim.' 75 Given the "substantially outweighed"
standard required for exclusion, it is difficult to understand how the balance
could be struck otherwise than for the defendant. This is especially true be-
cause of the fact that when the prejudice versus probative issue is considered
on appeal, the usual practice is "to view both probative force and prejudice
,, 176most favorably towards the proponent ....
In its brief the State raised another objection to the evidence: that it
would overemphasize Daniels as a "battering husband." 'n While the Ohio
Supreme Court did not address this argument, the court in Ibn-Tamas v.
United States 78 did. That court reasoned that since the trial judge had admit-
ted other evidence tending to establish the decedent's violent nature, any
prejudicial impact from the testimony would be minimal. 179 It concluded that
the testimony's probative value outweighed its prejudicial impact as a matter
of law. 80 Considering the testimony heard by the jury in Thomas,'8' the
reasoning of Ibn-Tamas clearly rebuts the State's contention that the expert
testimony about Daniel's violent nature would be prejudicial.
After considering the prejudice versus probative argument, the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court in State v. Anaya '82 reached the same conclusion as
the Ibn-Tamas court. In Anaya the trial judge excluded expert testimony
concerning battered women because, among other things, it was found to be
171. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note.
172. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 403[03] (1981) (footnotes omitted).
173. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1981).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 105-13.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 108-14.
176. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 172, at 403[03].
177. Brief for Appellant at 6.
178. 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
179. Id. at 639.
180. Id.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
182. 438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981).
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prejudicial and confusing to the jury.' 83 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
held that the exclusion on that ground constituted a reversible error.' The
court explained:
Interpreting the decision below as one based on Rule 403, we find such an abuse of
discretion. Both [experts'] testimonies were highly probative and more helpful
than confusing to the jury. The record shows that Dr. Bishop would have testified
that ... abused women perceive suicide and/or homicide to be the only solutions
to their problems. This evidence would have given the jury reason to believe that
the defendant's conduct was, contrary to the State's assertions, consistent with
her theory of self-defense. 8
In ruling on the admissibility of the expert testimony, the trial judge in
Thomas did not give the prejudicial-versus-probative ground as a reason for
excluding the evidence. 86 He had the best opportunity to consider the pos-
sible prejudicial impact of the testimony since he was acquainted with the
circumstances. A trial transcript alone cannot provide this sensitivity. Thus, it
made little sense for Judge Brown to raise this issue at all, especially since he
found the evidence irrelevant, and thus, as a matter of law, without probative
value '87 to be outweighed by the prejudicial impact on the jury.
IV. THE EFFECT OF STATE V. THOMAS
It is unclear what effects the Thomas decision will have on the future use
of expert testimony concerning battered women. Even though the State un-
equivocally urged the court to find the evidence inadmissible as a matter of
law, 188 the opinion never addressed that issue. To the contrary, Judge Brown
began his opinion by stating that "[t]he sole issue raised by the state in its
appeal to this court is whether the trial court committed reversible error by
excluding testimony on the subject of the 'battered wife syndrome' ....
Further, since only two judges concurred in the opinion,190 its authoritative
weight is questionable. Also, Judge Brown used the phrase "is inadmissible
herein," 91 which may indicate that given a different case, the court might
hold otherwise. In her dissent from the court of appeals decision, Judge
Krupansky suggested a similar notion: "[This court must not be blinded by
the rhetoric no matter how righteous the cause may be. Nor may we use an
inappropriate case as a springboard to break new ground in undeveloped
areas of the law in order to be part of the avant garde." '92 Thus, trial judges
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 894.
186. State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397. 403 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137
(1981).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
188. Brief for Appellant at 7.
189. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520, 423 N.E.2d 137, 139 (1981).
190. The two concurring judges were W. Brown and Sweeney. Id. at 522, 423 N.E.2d at 140.
191. Id. at 521, 423 N.E.2d at 140 (emphasis added).
192. State v. Thomas, 17 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 408 (Ct. App. 1980) (Krupansky, J., dissenting), rev'd, 66 Ohio
St. 2d 518, 423 N.E.2d 137 (1981) (emphasis added).
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who exclude similar testimony in the future cannot necessarily depend on the
Thomas case to provide a safe harbor for their decisions.' 93
And what of the trial judge who admits the testimony? Properly read,
Thomas cannot be viewed as a limitation on the trial judge's latitude in admit-
ting this type of evidence. It is well established under Ohio case law that the
trial judge has wide discretion in admitting expert testimony.'94 Likewise, the
United States Supreme Court has held that a judge's decision to admit ev-
idence should not be set aside "unless manifestly erroneous." '95 Thus, it
should not be inferred from Thomas that a trial judge who admits expert
testimony regarding battered women has committed a reversible error. The
court's conclusion was that the exclusion of the testimony did not constitute
an error. Any extension of this conclusion would undermine the discretion
traditionally exercised by trial courts.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ohio Supreme Court's cursory treatment of Thomas indicates its
distaste in general for the battered woman defense. If the court was deter-
mined to hold against the defendant, it could have done so by finding that the
trial judge had not abused his discretion by finding the testimony unhelpful to
the jury. Instead, it chose to wage a superficial attack on the admissibility of
expert testimony on battered women. In doing so, the court not only went
beyond the question before it on appeal, but also incorrectly applied Ohio
evidence law, creating confusion for trial courts that will face this issue in the
future. The ambiguity of Thomas will undoubtedly cause anxiety for trial
judges who must rule on the admissibility of this testimony. But while the
decision temporarily creates a safe harbor for judges choosing to exclude the
testimony under similar circumstances, it should not be seen as an obstacle to
the perceptive trial judge who, within his or her discretion, finds the evidence
admissible.
M. Katherine Jenson
193. In her dissent from the court of appeals decision. Judge Krupansky listed the following eight reasons
why the exclusion of the testimony was not an error:
(I) There was no proper proffer of expert testimony;
(2) Appellant's [defendant's] expert had no personal contact with appellant;
(3) No hypothetical question was propounded to appellant's expert witness;
(4) There was no determination that appellant was, in fact, a battered woman;
(5) Analysis of the issues raised was within the realm of the jury;
(6) The trial court's jury charge more than adequately covered the situation;
(7) There was no prejudice to appellant;
(8) The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Id. at 409. Judge Brown referred with approval to these eight reasons. 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 520, 423 N.E.2d 137,
139 (1981). Of the eight the first four do not present significant obstacles to future defendants. Under Ohio's
rules of evidence, hypothetical question use is now optional. OHIO R. EVID. 705 staff note. The remainder of
these four can be avoided by counsel. By removing these four barriers, future defense counsel may be able to
overcome the protective shield that Thomas placed around the trial judge who excludes expert testimony
concering battered women.
194. State v. Auerbach. 108 Ohio St. %, 140 N.E. 507 (1923); Wabash R.R. v. City of Defiance, 52 Ohio St.
262, 40 N.E. 89 (1895), affd, 167 U.S. 88 (1897); Yoder v. Bernier, 40 Ohio App. 2d 369, 361 N.E.2d 490 (Ct.
App. 1976); Gano v. Cleveland, Cin.. Chi. & St. L. Ry., 33 Ohio App. 142, 168 N.E. 566 (Ct. App. 1929);
Cincinnati St. Ry. v. Hickey. 29 Ohio App. 399, 163 N.E. 310 (Ct. App. 1928).
195. Salem v. U.S. Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962).
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